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Emerging theories on embodied cogni-
tion have caused high expectations, ambi-
tious promises, and strong controversies.
Several criticisms have been explained
elsewhere (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008;
Cardona et al., 2014) and will not be
discussed further here. In this paper, we
will focus on a specific explanatory strat-
egy frequently assessed by the radical
embodied cognition approaches: the use of
homuncular explanations for the explicit
(or implicit) attribution of causal roles
in the comprehension of language under-
standing. We first present this criticism
regarding a prototypical example: the mir-
ror neuron system (MNS) (Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004; Iacoboni and Dapretto,
2006) in the field of language understand-
ing and then extend our conclusions to
other programs of embodied cognition.
Here we discuss the radical claims that
propose the MNS as the putative mech-
anism for multiple cognitive and social
psychology constructs (e.g., Gallese, 2008;
Cattaneo and Rizzolatti, 2009; Iacoboni,
2009) and the critical role of the MNS
in language understanding (Heyes, 2010a;
Hickok, 2013).
A BIG PROBLEM: HOMUNCULARITY
AND CAUSALITY OF THE MNS
In the homuncular explanation (Clark,
1997; Kolak et al., 2006), a phenomeno-
logical description of a cognitive event
attributed to a whole person (in this case,
language understanding) is granted to a
subset of brain regions (in this case, the
MNS) by using discrete representations.
This is the case for radical MNS accounts.
TheMNS helps in understanding observed
actions by extracting and representing
goals or meanings (Rizzolatti et al., 2001;
Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004). The fun-
damental role proposed for the MNS is
that of allowing the individual to under-
stand the goal of the action he/she is
observing (Fogassi et al., 2005). Gallese
(2006) proposed that the MNS allows
one to directly access the understanding
of others. The so-called “direct-matching
hypothesis” suggests that “an action is
understood when its observation causes
the motor system of the observer to ‘res-
onate’” (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). Thus, the
MNS is proposed as an automatic and
mandatory mechanism for understanding
(Csibra, 2007).
These “homuncular” approaches to
the MNS have favored a plethora of
mesmerizing functional explanations,
from action to higher social cognition
(Heyes, 2010b). In the case of language,
the intrinsically linguistic property of
“understanding” becomes a property of
MNS activation. Contrary to homuncu-
lar explanations, current brain network
approaches to language (Turken and
Dronkers, 2011; Friederici and Gierhan,
2013) have shown that language process-
ing requires an orchestrated coordination
of different brain regions indexing differ-
ent processes. The MNS probably plays
an important role in priming or facili-
tating understanding (or even perhaps
in indexing action semantics), but this
does not imply that the MNS plays a key
role in language understanding. Even in
action language processing, where the
MNS seems to be more engaged, other
non-MNS regions (such as specific sites
for language processing and motor habits)
seem to play an important role (Arbib,
2010; van Dam et al., 2010; Amoruso et al.,
2013; Cardona et al., 2013; Ibanez et al.,
2013; Sakreida et al., 2013). Thus, a single
MNS process explaining the whole phe-
nomenon of understanding seems to be a
less fruitful approach when compared with
a network view of language processing.
The homuncular explanation attributes
a causal role to a specific region regard-
ing a complete function. In this radical
approach, instead of considering the
MNS as an important hub of a net-
work indexing language properties, the
MNS itself seems to generate language
understanding. Several radical claims
highlighting this causal mechanism in lan-
guage understanding have been proposed.
For example, Pulvermüller (2005a) wrote:
“. . .words that denote internal states, such
as ‘pain’ or ‘disgust,’ can be understood
only because both speaker and listener can
relate them to similar motor programs. . . ”
(italics mine); and furthermore: “under-
standing language means relating language
to one’s own actions.” Aziz-Zadeh et al.
(2006) declare: “these results suggest a
key role of mirror neuron areas in the
re-enactment of sensory-motor represen-
tations during conceptual processing of
actions invoked by linguistic stimuli” (see
also Zarr et al., 2013).
Considering the MNS as a causal
explanatory mechanism for language
understanding would appear like a
pseudo-explanation. The homuncular,
metonymic attribution of language under-
standing as a causal property of the MNS
involves nothing but a lack of explanation.
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In spite of these radical claims about the
MNS, to our knowledge there is no canon-
ical or putative mechanistic explanation
for language understanding based on the
MNS. By definition, the MNS contains
mirror neurons and other neurons for
matching the observation and execution
of action (Rizzolatti and Craighero, 2004;
Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006). How does
the MNS generate or produce understand-
ing? Just by resonating when observing or
executing actions? The MNS property of
being activated when observing/executing
actions is not an explanation of how lan-
guage understanding emerges. At the very
least, language understanding requires
syntactic and semantic access, memory,
executive functions, and other language-
specific knowledge (Binder et al., 1997;
Friederici, 2011; Price, 2012). A subset of
neurons in an artificial system can easily
be trained to respond to action obser-
vation/execution, mimicking the basic
definition of the MNS. Nevertheless, this
property by itself will surely not gener-
ate language understanding. The main
problem with the explanation of language
understanding as MNS activity is that
there is no real explanation at the level of
language content.
Is MNS activation a cause or an
accompanying effect of language under-
standing? There is a lack of empirical evi-
dence for the putative causal role of MNS
in language understanding. In cognitive
neuroscience, there are illustrative exam-
ples of the causal role of an area in a
function. For example, electrical stimu-
lation of the anterior insula triggers the
experience of disgust (Caruana et al.,
2011). Similarly, electrical stimulation of
the fusiform gyrus can selectively dis-
rupt face perception (Parvizi et al., 2012).
Therefore, we can conclude that the insula
and the fusiform gyrus have a causal and
critical role in the experience of disgust
and in face perception, respectively. Those
cases do not have a full causal expla-
nation (in the Aristotelian sense of an
“efficient” cause) because these regions
are connected with several other brain
regions whose involvement also affects
the emotional and perceptual response.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to suggest
a critical role of these regions in the gener-
ation of the disgust experience or in facial
perception.
Focal lesion studies may provide more
direct answers to these questions (Rorden
and Karnath, 2004). Reports on apha-
sic and apraxic patients fully support the
embodied nature of cognition. However,
these have yielded controversial results
regarding the causal explanations of
“understanding.” Overlaps (Rothi et al.,
1985; Saygin et al., 2003; Nelissen et al.,
2010) and dissociations (Rothi et al., 1991;
Mahon and Caramazza, 2005) between
language and action networks have been
reported. In any case, the overlap is not
enough to assert that understanding
occurs as an effect of motor resonance or
to establish a unidirectional causal expla-
nation. Experiments in which researchers
are able to show a given region’s critical
role in a specific function are extremely
scarce in MNS research regarding lan-
guage understanding. To our knowledge,
there is no single experiment demonstrat-
ing that MNS activity plays a causal role in
language understanding instead of merely
reflecting it. Thus, the strong claims about
the causal role of the MNS in language
understanding contrast with the scarce
available evidence.
Most of the evidence regarding the
MNS and action language is centered
around facilitation effects, i.e., under-
standing is not dependent on MNS acti-
vation (measured directly or indirectly),
but is only facilitated by it. For example,
Pulvermüller et al. (2005b) showed that
Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS)
of the hand area in the left hemisphere led
to faster responses to hand-related words
in a lexical decision task, while stimulat-
ing the leg area in the left hemisphere
had the same effect on leg-related words.
This effect was not present in control con-
ditions (stimulating the right hemisphere
and sham stimulation). Similarly, Tucker
and Ellis (2004) found a response compat-
ibility effect when subjects used an input
device that required either a power or a
precision grip to indicate whether objects
that required either type of grip were nat-
ural or man-made. Responses were faster
when the presented object (picture or
word) required the same grip type as the
input device. Most studies show language
understanding as capacity that is facili-
tated by MNS involvement or attenuated
byMNS disruption. Nevertheless, no stud-
ies have assessed interfered or abolished
understanding, or shown a critical depen-
dence on the MNS. Thus, evidence sug-
gests that the MNS reflects the effect
of understanding rather than causing it
(Hickok, 2013). The MNS might play an
important role in general associative learn-
ing (Heyes, 2010b; Cooper et al., 2013)
or a specific facilitation/priming effect in
language understanding, but not a causal
role in understanding by itself. There is
no doubt about the activation of the MNS
during execution and observation, but sev-
eral concerns arise when this activation is
interpreted as a causal explanatory mecha-
nism in several cognitive domains.
CAUSAL EXPLANATIONS IN
NEUROSCIENTIFIC EMBODIED
COGNITION
The notion of a causal role for MNS
in language understanding is a proto-
typical example of a radical claim that
a single region subserves understanding.
In the language domain, other similar
causal explanations have been proposed.
The Embodied Semantics theory claims
that processing the meaning of a con-
cept recruits the same neural networks
that underlie the perceptual and motor
experiences associated with it (Gallese and
Lakoff, 2005). In other words, regions
that are activated during action obser-
vation and action execution should also
be activated during the comprehension of
words referring to those actions. It has
been reported that this activation follows
a somatotopical pattern (Hauk et al., 2004;
Pulvermüller, 2005a), that is, leg concepts
(“kicking”) activate the homuncular leg
area in the motor cortex and mouth con-
cepts (“eating”) activate the mouth area.
Even though evidence has shown this type
of activation pattern, the match is not
exact and the overlap is inconsistent within
and across different studies (Postle et al.,
2008; Turella et al., 2009; Arbib, 2010;
Fernandino and Iacoboni, 2010; Arevalo
et al., 2012). Other regions that have been
implicated in tasks involving the process-
ing of linguistic stimuli are the prefrontal
cortex, the temporal lobe and the cerebel-
lum (Arbib, 2010). Furthermore, lesions
to the motor cortex do not necessarily
cause deficits in action-word processing
(Saygin et al., 2004). In sum, although
there is motor and premotor activation
when processing language (Glenberg et al.,
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2008) and linguistic comprehension might
be enhanced by it, there is no conclusive
empirical evidence showing that this is a
sufficient mechanism for linguistic under-
standing (Fischer and Zwaan, 2008).
Other areas of embodied cognition,
including radical MNS approaches to
action understanding, imitation, emo-
tion, and social cognition, present the
same potential pitfall: the temptation to
use a simplistic homuncular explanation
for the phenomenon of understanding
through a single resonating brain area.
Current brain network views and non-
MNS accounts of classical domains such as
action observation/recognition (Buccino
et al., 2004; Kokal et al., 2009), imi-
tation (Molenberghs et al., 2009), lan-
guage (Grodzinsky et al., 2000; Hickok and
Poeppel, 2007; Friederici, 2011) and social
cognition (emotion, empathy, and theory
of mind; Baird et al., 2011; Decety et al.,
2012; Ibanez and Manes, 2012; Kennedy
and Adolphs, 2012) can be integrated
with the experience-based and situated
nature of cognition without appealing to
a simplistic execution-observation match-
ing system or attributing the cogni-
tive phenomenon of interest to a single
brain region. Although our experience is
embodied, our emotions are embodied,
and even our culture is embodied, this
does not mean ipso facto that the activa-
tion of discrete hypothetical representa-
tions in a single region would be enough
to explain the emergence of understand-
ing. In other words, emotions, language
and culture are grounded (Barsalou, 2008)
in our bodily experiences, but this does not
necessarily mean that there is a simple iso-
morphism between the actual body and
the spatiotemporally-distributed activity
of body signals in the brain (Berlucchi and
Aglioti, 2010).
The extremely significant emergence of
embodied cognition, highlighting the role
of the body, emotions and culture as well
as the subjective experience in shaping the
human mind, can and should be detached
from a simplistic and at the same time
radical homuncular view that human cog-
nitive understanding is ruled by a single
discrete brain area.
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